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Abstract
We test the null hypothesis that involuntary transfers for the provision of a public good will
completely crowd out voluntary transfers against the warm-glow hypothesis that crowding-out will
be incomplete because individuals care about giving.  Our design differs from the related design used
by Andreoni in considering two levels of the involuntary transfer and a wider range of contribution
possibilities, and in mixing groups every period instead of every four periods.  We analyse the data
with careful attention to boundary effects.  We retain the null hypothesis of complete crowding-out
in two of three pairwise comparisions, but reject it in favour of incomplete crowding-out in the
comparison most closely akin to Andreoni’s design.  Thus we confirm the existence of incomplete
crowding-out in some environments, but suggest that the warm-glow hypothesis is inadequate in
explaining it.
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Crowding Out Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
1.  INTRODUCTION
Warr (1982, 1983), Roberts (1984, 1987), Bernheim (1986) and Bergstrom, Blume, and
Varian (1986) suggest that voluntary contributions by individuals to public goods may be completely
crowded out by government contributions to the same public goods.  These results suggest a futility
to government spending policy.  Empirical research investigating the issue of the neutrality of
government spending on public goods by Abrams and Schmitz (1978, 1984), Clotfelter (1985), and
Kingma (1989) suggests that crowding out is incomplete, and likely to be small (less than thirty
percent of private contributions may be crowded out by government spending).
Andreoni (1993) has attempted to ascertain whether the incomplete crowding out found in
the empirical studies can be attributed to institutional features not captured by the theoretical models
or to individual preferences different from those incorporated into the theoretical models.  This is
done in a laboratory environment.  He finds incomplete crowding out when an involuntary transfer
resembling a tax is levied on individuals and the resulting revenue is transferred to the provision of
the public good.  Andreoni (1993: 1317) suggests that his results may be “taken as evidence for
alternative models that assume people experience some private benefit from contributing to public
goods.”  This would support Andreoni’s (1990) warm-glow giving  as an explanation for incomplete
crowding out.
There is an alternative explanation to warm-glow giving as an explanation for incomplete
crowding out observed in laboratory experiments.  Boundary effects induced by the tax on the choices2
that individuals have regarding contributions of resources for the provision of public goods may be
reflected in increased public good provision under the tax regimes.  Andreoni’s (1993) results,
however, suggest this is not a credible alternative in his environment.
This paper extends Andreoni's analysis by providing subjects larger endowments of resouces
to allocate and by permitting the subjects to experience three different tax treatments.  We test the
null hypothesis of complete crowding-out against an alternative  model of individual behaviour which
assumes people experience a private benefit from contributing to public goods but that this benefit
increases at a decreasing rate as voluntary contributions rise is tested.  This model can be consistent
with Andreoni's crowding-out results in a laboratory setting and it provides a testable prediction
which can extend the laboratory evidence on incomplete crowding out of government contributions
to public goods.  We analyse the data with close attention to boundary effects.  We retain the null
hypothesis of complete crowding-out in two of three pairwise comparisons but reject it in favour of
incomplete crowding-out in the comparison most closely akin to Andreoni’s design.  Thus we confirm
the existence of incomplete crowding-out in some environments but suggest that the warm-glow
hypothesis is inadequate in explaining it.
The alternative behavioral models are presented in section 2.  Section 3 contains the
experimental design.  Predictions, results, and a concluding discussion are presented in sections 4,
5, and 6, respectively.
2. THE BEHAVIOURAL MODELS
2.1. The Conventional Model
The conventional model of the allocation of resources by individuals among public and private     
1  This equilibrium has the following properties: richer individuals contribute more to the
provision of the public good than do poorer individuals; if the distribution of income is sufficiently
unequal, very poor individuals contribute nothing; redistribution of income among individuals who
contribute a positive amount both before and after the redistribution has no effect on the aggregate
quantity of the public good; redistribution of income from non-contributing individuals to contributing
individuals increases the aggregate quantity of the public good.  See Theorems 3 and 5 in Bergstrom,










goods is described by Bergstrom et al.  Following Bergstrom et al. the individual chooses private
consumption,  , and contributions to the public good,  , to solve the problem xi gi
subject to the budget constraint  , the public goods identity  , and the xi % gi ’ wi G ’ G&i % gi
non-negativity constraint  .    denotes the allocations of all individuals except  , and   is gi $ 0 G&i i wi
the individual's income. 
If the payoff to individual   is given by i
where   denotes aggregate contributions to the public good, the best response function for individual G
 is  i
  If the returns to individuals are fully captured by the payoff function (2), Bergstrom et al.
prove there is a unique Nash equilibrium.
1  This model has been tested in a laboratory environment4
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by Chan, Mestelman, Moir, and Muller (1996) and is supported by the data when incomes are equally
distributed among participants in three-person groups.
2.2. The Alternative Model
Following Andreoni (1990), if individuals experience a private benefit from contributing to
the public good, (1) should be modified to
and the individual's problem is unchanged.  If the payoff to individual   in (4) is expressed as i






2 < 0 i
Comparing (3) and (6) shows that ceteris paribus caring about giving leads to increased
contributions.  This is the prediction of the theory of warm-glow giving presented by Andreoni (1990)
using a specific explicit utility function.
2.3. The Behavioural Models and Taxation for Public Goods Provision
If individuals are taxed and the tax receipts are contributed to the provision of the public     
2  If individuals have the same payoff functions and endowments and if in equilibrium  , then G > 0
from   and equation (10),  G ’ ngi G ’ [W&(n&1)G&(n&1)T]&T%(n/2)[df(G/n)/d(G/n)]
where  .  Differentiating   with respect to  yields  and W ’ nwi C ’ G%T T dC/dT ’ [dG/dT]%1
differentiating   with respect to   yields  .  Finally, G T dG/dT ’ [&1%[(d 2f(gi)/dgi
2)/(n%1)]]&1
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good, the functions (2) and (5) become
where   is the sum of the lump-sum taxes collected from all the individuals.  The best response T
functions (3) and (6) become
where   is the tax paid by individual   and  .  The equilibria of these models augmented ti i T&i ’ T & ti
by the tax and spending provisions are described by Bergstrom et al. and Andreoni (1990).  Assuming
 individuals have the same payoff functions and same endowments, when an equilibrium is realized n







in equilibrium are lower under the conventional model than under the alternative model which
includes a warm-glow from giving.  As well, contributions rise as the tax is increased
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but it falls by less than the tax increase.
2  Therefore crowding out increases as tax collections increase.     
3  The sessions were conducted between July and September 1993.  Nearly all of the subjects were
from McMaster University.  There were several subjects who were students at the University of
Western Ontario and King's College.  Several of the McMaster students were graduate students --
five in Economics and one in English.  These students were scattered throughout the five sessions
(there was no session which was dominated by graduate students in Economics).  The payoffs ranged
from $16.00 to $25.00 with a mean of $20.62 and a standard deviation of $1.51.
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3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
An environment was created in a laboratory in which individuals were given endowments of
tokens, were told they were members of small groups, and were asked to allocate their token incomes
between a private good and a public good.  Their payoffs depended upon their decisions and the
decisions of the others in their group, and were given by equation (7).  Sometime the incomes of
these individuals were taxed, sometime they were not.  The tax varied between fifteen percent and
twenty-five percent of their endowments.  The tax was implemented in a decision round (period) by
requiring that subjects make a particular minimum contribution to the public good in that period.  
Five sessions were conducted during which sixty subjects (twelve each session) participated
in groups of three for a series of fifteen periods.
3  In each period subjects were asked to allocate
endowments of twenty tokens across two markets.  Each subject was given a payoff table which
reflected payoffs from equation (2) for each possible allocation to the public good (identified to the
subject as a Market 2 allocation) and each possible allocation to the public good by the other
members of the subject's group.  This table formed a matrix with forty-one rows and twenty-one
columns.  Each subject knew the other subjects' endowments and payoff functions.  All this
information was common knowledge.  Token payoffs were converted into Canadian dollars at the
exchange rate 200 tokens to one Canadian dollar.
After each period, the members of the groups were scrambled.  At the start of each period the     
4  The groups were not constructed randomly.  A conscious effort was made to minimize the
number of times individuals participated in groups with each other.  As well, the allocation of
minimum requirements to groups was done in such a way as to be certain that they were spread as
evenly as possible across the last twelve periods and that they were allocated as evenly as possible
across the subjects.  This was done to minimize the likelihood that some minimum requirements
appeared more frequently in early periods rather than later periods or the likelihood that some
subjects were presented with a particular minimum requirement more than four or five times.
     
5  Copies of the instructions are available from the authors.
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members of each group were informed of the minimum required contribution for that period.
4  This
minimum contribution of zero, three or five tokens was common for all members of any given group
in any one period but was varied from period to period, so that individuals were neither participating
with the same partners nor facing the same minimum contribution period after period.  This was done
to eliminate reputation effects, to eliminate incentives to send signals to partners, to offset subject
effects, and to create an environment in which each decision round could be treated as a one-shot
contribution game.  The number of observations of individual contributions in each period by
minimum required contribution is shown in Table 1.  The treatments are identified as A, B, and C,
corresponding to no tax, a tax of 3 tokens, and a tax of 5 tokens.
The subjects were inexperienced in this environment.  No subject participated in more than
one session.  Instructions were read to the subjects, who each followed along on their own copies of
the instructions.
5  A short quiz was administered to assure the investigators that the subjects
understood the nature of their tasks and how to read a payoff table.  In each period, subjects entered
their contributions on a computer terminal.  At the end of the period, each terminal displayed each
subject's own contribution, contributions made by each of the members of the subject's group, the
subject's payoff for the period, and the subject's cumulative payoff.  In addition, the screen displayed
the minimum required contribution at the start of each period.  The computer would not accept8
contributions which violated the minimum contribution constraint; the subject was informed of this
violation by the absence of a contribution on the terminal's screen.  The period ended when all
subjects had submitted allowable contributions.
4. PREDICTIONS
4.1. Crowding Out Predictions: General
If income is taken from individuals via a lump-sum tax and this income is contributed to the
provision of the public good, both the conventional and alternative models predict that private
contributions will be crowded out.  For the payoffs given by (7), Bergstrom et al. show that crowding
out will be complete for individuals who are contributors before the imposition of the tax if the tax
does not exceed their before-tax contributions.  Private contributions will be crowded out one dollar
for one dollar, and the tax/spending policy will be neutral with respect to public good provision.
Andreoni (1990) shows that for individuals who care about contributing, and who receive payoffs
given by (8), crowding out will be incomplete.  Private contributions to the public good will be
crowded out by less than one dollar for each tax dollar collected and contributed by the taxing
authority to the public good.  Public good provision will increase.
In the laboratory environment, each subject is provided with a payoff table reflecting the
payoffs given by (7).  The imposition of a lump-sum tax which is used to provide a public good is
accomplished by requiring that subjects make a minimum contribution.  Changing the minimum
required contribution does not affect the Nash equilibrium contribution per subject per period if (7)
is the payoff function actually followed by the subject.  Changing the minimum contribution does
affect the Nash equilibrium contribution per subject per period if the payoff function is (8).  If a     
6  The Nash equilibrium voluntary contributions of five and two tokens, when the minimum
required contributions are zero and three tokens, respectively, do not represent dominant strategy
equilibria.  The Nash equilibrium voluntary contribution of zero tokens when the minimum required
contribution is five does represent a dominant strategy equilibrium.
     
7  For minimum required contributions of zero or three tokens, (5,5,5), (4,5,6), (4,6,5), (5,4,6),
(5,6,4), (6,4,5), and (6,5,4) are the possible contributions by participants (1,2,3) which are Nash
equilibria.  When the minimum required contribution is five tokens, (5,5,5) is the only Nash
equilibrium allocation.
9
subject receives a payoff in addition to the induced payoff given by the payoff table, and if this
additional payoff is related to the subject's voluntary contribution (total contribution less the minimum
required contribution) as characterized by  , a subject's total contribution will rise as the minimum f(gi)
required contribution rises.
For the environment described in the previous section (three-subject groups, income of twenty
tokens each period, and payoffs given by (7)), the Nash equilibrium total contribution for each subject
is five tokens.  The Nash equilibrium voluntary contributions fall from five to two to zero tokens as
the minimum required contribution (the tax) rises from zero to three to five tokens.
6
Because participants must make integer contributions the payoff tables reflecting the best
response function (3) contain multiple individual Nash equilibrium allocations when the minimum
required contributions are zero and three tokens.
7  If it is equally likely that each of the Nash
equilibria occur, the expected total contribution of each subject is five tokens.  This also is the
individual Nash equilibrium contribution for the continuous payoff function.
If subjects augment their induced payoffs so that (8) is the appropriate representation of their
payoff function, individual Nash equilibrium total contributions will rise as the minimum required
contribution rises.  Individual Nash equilibrium voluntary contributions will exceed five, two, and10
zero when the minimum required contributions are zero, three, and five, respectively.  The equilibrium
predictions from payoff functions (7) and (8) are presented in Table 2.  The conventional model
predicts that with no tax the individual contribution will be 5 tokens and that with the introduction
of any tax crowding out will be complete.  The alternative model predicts that 
P1: When there is no tax imposed, individual contributions will exceed 5.
P2: When a tax of 3 is imposed, total individual contributions will exceed the individual
contributions made when there is no tax imposed.
 P3: When a tax of 5 is imposed, total individual contributions will exceed the individual
contributions made when there is no tax imposed.
P4: When a tax of 5 is imposed, total individual contributions will exceed the total
individual contributions made when there is a tax of 3 imposed.
4.2. Boundary Effects
 For any number of reasons, subjects in public goods environments may wish to make
contributions at, above, or below the induced Nash equilibrium contribution.  Even if the Nash
equilibrium contribution characterizes the central tendency of individual contributions in laboratory
public goods environments, the contributions themselves will be distributed around the Nash
equilibrium value.  If, however, contributions are bounded at or below the Nash equilibrium
prediction some of the low contributions will be censored.  By setting a minimum required
contribution, some contributions which would otherwise be below the boundary will be forced to the
boundary.  This will raise the mean value of the observed contributions over what the mean value     
8  A formal development of this prediction is provided in Chan, Godby, Mestelman, and Muller
(1994).
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would have been if the boundary was not imposed.
8  This implies that under either form of the
underlying behavioural function
Implication 1: The mean of the observed contributions will increase as the minimum
required contribution is increased from 0 to 3 to 5.
On the null hypothesis that subjects do not care about giving (that payoff function (7) reflects
the preferences of subjects in this experiment), the distribution of observed contributions under each
treatment should differ only by the effect of the changing boundary.  If   is the observed total gjt
contribution for subject j in time period t (j = 2,...,60; t = 4,...,14),   is the total contribution in g n
Nash equilibrium when subjects do not care about giving, and   is the minimum required g
mr
jt
contribution for subject j in time period t, 
so that the cumulative distribution of contributions is equal to the cumulative normal distribution
, and is independent of treatment for all contributions greater than or equal to the maximum of M[@]
the minimum required contributions in the treatments being compared.  This leads to the following
predictions on the alternative hypothesis that the subjects care about giving:
P5: If the observations from Treatments A and B that are less than 5 are recoded to
equal 5, the new distributions, A5, B5, and the distribution of the observations for
Treatment C will be different.12
P6: If the observations from Treatment A that are less than 3 are recoded to equal 3, the
new distribution, A3, will be different from the distribution of the observations  for
Treatment B. 
P7: If the observations from Treatment B that are less than 5 are recoded to equal 5, the
new distribution, B5 , will be different from the distribution of the observations for
Treatment C.
P8: If the observations from Treatment A that are less than 5 are recoded to equal 5, the
new distribution, A5 , will be different from the distribution of the observations for
Treatment C.
5.  RESULTS
Table 1 shows the number of observations in each period by minimum required contribution.
In total there are 720 observations.  For each minimum required contribution there are 240
observations spread across 12 periods or decision rounds.  The mean contributions (and
corresponding standard deviations) and median contributions across all participants and the mean
median contributions (and corresponding standard deviations) across sessions are presented for each
treatment in Table 3.
It is clear that mean observed contributions increase in accordance with Implication 1.
Because the observations are censored, standard t-tests are not valid.  Employed descriptively,
however, t-tests indicate that the mean contribution for treatment A is not significantly different from
the Nash equilibrium contribution of 5 tokens (p = 0.596) and that the mean contributions for
treatments B and C are significantly greater than 5 tokens (p = 0.000 for both cases).  In addition, the        8  Tobit regressions which account for the censored observations confirm these results.  A
detailed  analysis of the Tobit regression results are included in Chan, Godby, Mestelman, and
Muller (1994).
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mean contribution for treatment B is significantly greater than the mean contribution for treatment
A and the mean contribution for treatment C is significantly greater than the mean contribution for
treatment B (p = 0.000 for both cases).
9  Thus we have
Result 1: We retain the null hypothesis that mean contributions in Treatment A are 5
tokens.
Result 2:  The mean of observed contributions increases as the tax (and boundary) rises
from 0 to 3 to 5 tokens.
Because the mean contributions for each treatment are sensitive to boundary effects, it is
inappropriate to use mean data to identify the existence of incomplete crowding out without first
accounting for these effects.  The median of the distribution of individual total contributions is a
measure of central tendency which should not be sensitive to boundary effects introduced by tax
treatments as long as the taxes are less than the median contribution in the no-tax treatment.  For each
of Treatments A, B, and C the median of the distribution of contributions is 5.  This suggests that
whatever impact the tax treatments have on the distribution of contributions, it is not sufficient to
change the median.  This is a weak test of the null hypothesis that crowding out is complete.   A
second test uses the median values of the distributions for each treatment generated in the five
sessions in this experiment.  The mean across the five sessions of the median values for each treatment
are presented in Table 3.  Neither the means of Treatments A and B, B and C, nor A and C are
significantly different from each other (exact randomization tests, p = 0.183, p = 0.500, and p = 0.143
respectively).14
These results suggest that the data from this experiment may support complete crowding out
and the conventional public good model.  It is important, however, to try to account for boundary
effects and to use all of the contribution data.  In particular, it is important to use the same
methodology introduced in Andreoni (1993) to evaluate the extent of crowding out in this
experiment.
The distribution of contributions, by minimum required contribution, across all of the possible
contributions, is presented in Table 4.  For Treatment A, contributions range from 0 to 15 tokens.
The range extends to the full endowment of 20 when a minimum contribution is required.  Under all
three treatments, contributions greater than or equal to 10 tokens (half of each subjects endowment)
account for approximately ten percent of all contributions.
A test of the null hypothesis that crowding out is complete can be conducted by comparing
the distributions of Treatments A, B, and C for which the observations are recoded so that all
contributions less than or equal to 5 tokens are coded as 5 tokens (columns A5, B5 and C in Table 4).
A test of the null hypothesis that three distributions are the same against the alternative that they
differ cannot be rejected (P
2 = 29.493, p = 0.202).  This is a rejection of Prediction 5.  However, a
visual comparison of columns A3 and B or A5 and B5 in Table 4 suggest that there may be a difference
between Treatments A and B taken by themselves.
The distribution for Treatment B is significantly different from the distribution for Treatment
A regardless of whether columns A3 and B or A5 and B5 in Table 4 are compared (P
2 = 31.392, p =
0.003 and P
2 = 21.762, p = 0.026 respectively).  This is consistent with the result reported by
Andreoni (1993) and suggests that there appears to be incomplete crowding out of voluntary
contributions to public good provision when the tax of 3 is imposed.  These results support     
10  These results also can be obtained using Tobit regression analysis to account for the boundary
effects created by the censoring associated with the imposition of the tax.  A detailed analysis of the
Tobit regression results are included in Chan, Godby, Mestelman and Muller (1994).
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Predictions 2 and 6.
However, extending this test to comparisons of Treatments B and C and Treatments A and
C does not support incomplete crowding out.  The distribution for Treatment C is neither significantly
different from the distribution for Treatment A after recoding to group all contributions less than or
equal to 5 (P
2 = 18.163, p = 0.111), nor different from the distribution for Treatment B (P
2 = 5.923,
p = 0.878).  This provides support for the rejection of Predictions 3, 4, 7 and 8.
Result 3: Although the data support incomplete crowding out when when a tax less
than the  no-tax individual voluntary contribution is imposed, complete
crowding out cannot be rejected if the tax is equal to the average individual
voluntary contribution or if a larger tax replaces a smaller tax.
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1.  Boundary Effects
When individuals’ decisions to contribute to the provision of public goods are constrained or
bounded, the mean of the resulting contributions may not correctly reflect the true central tendency
of contributions made by individuals.  Because of this, it is inappropriate to use parameter estimates
which have not accounted for boundary effects.  
Accounting for boundary effects by using median rather than mean contributions suggests
that, when no minimum contribution is required, the central tendency of the contribution of subjects
to the provision of a public good is not different from that predicted by the conventional public goods16
model.  Furthermore, the tax treatments do not appear to move the median contribution from the
Nash equilibrium contribution of the conventional model.  
Nevertheless, the significant difference in the censored distributions of contributions under
Treatments A and B suggest that boundary effects are incapable of fully explaining the observed rise
in mean contributions in this case.  The range over which this unknown effect operates is limited,
however, because imposing a 5 token minimum contribution has no statistically significant effect on
the individual total contributions compared to the other two treatments.  Although boundary effects
are important, they cannot account for all of the instances of overcontributions.
6.2. Crowding Out and Warm-Glow Giving
Andreoni (1993) has conducted the only laboratory evaluation of the public goods crowding-
out hypothesis.  As noted, he found incomplete crowding-out and attributed it to warm-glow giving.
The environments in which Andreoni’s subjects participated were similar to the environments
described here.  There were several notable differences.  First, Andreoni’s subjects were reallocated
to different groups after every four periods.  In the sessions described here, subjects were reallocated
after every period.  Second, Andreoni’s subjects experienced only one environment, either no
minimum required contribution or a minimum required contribution which was less than the Nash
equilibrium contribution for the conventional model.  In the sessions described here, subjects
experienced three different environments with minimum required contributions of zero, fifteen, and
twenty-five percent of their per-period incomes.  Third, Andreoni's subjects had to allocate
endowments of seven tokens to two markets.  In the sessions described here, subjects had to allocate
endowments of twenty tokens.     
11  In both the Andreoni (1993) sessions and the sessions reported here the point estimates of the
mean contribution, unadjusted for censoring, subject effects, and period effects, are less than the Nash
equilibrium prediction for the conventional model under Treatment A.  These values are not
statistically different from the Nash equilibrium prediction when the alternative is that they exceed
the Nash equilibrium prediction, which is the prediction from the alternative model incorporating
warm-glow giving.
     
12  The extent to which crowding out exists between Treatments A and B is comparable to that
reported by Andreoni (1993).  The imposition of a minimum required contribution that is less than
the Nash equilibrium contribution predicted by the conventional model leads to crowding out of
voluntary contributions of more than sixty-five percent of the minimum contribution.  This is slightly
lower than the crowding out reported by Andreoni (1993), but much greater than the effects reported
in the work cited in Section 1.  
17
Our results confirm Andreoni’s incomplete crowding-out results in the case most similar to
his, but do not support the warm-glow interpretation.  The  Andreoni design is comparable to the
contrast between Treatments A and B.  For both data sets the minimum required contribution
increases from nothing to something less than the Nash equilibrium contribution of the conventional
model.  Result 2 shows that in the no-tax treatment the prediction of the conventional model, that
subjects will contribute five tokens to the provision of the public good, cannot be rejected in favor
of the alternative that their individual contributions will exceed five tokens.  This is consistent with
the result reported by Andreoni (1993) for the comparable treatment.
11  Result 3 shows that the
distributions of contributions for Treatments A and B are different and that in this case crowding out
is incomplete.  This also is comparable to the result reported by Andreoni, and provides support for
the alternative model which incorporates warm-glow giving.
12
Nevertheless, when the analysis is extended by increasing the minimum required contribution,
the warm-glow alternative model fails.  Section 2 established that on the alternative hypothesis,
contributions should be monotonic decreasing in the level of taxes.  Since imposition of a minimum
required contribution of 3 tokens under Treatment B leads to a significant shift in the distribution of18
contributions, the imposition of a minimum required contribution of 5 tokens should lead to a larger
shift.  Yet Result 3 indicates that that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the distributions under
Treatments A and C are identical, thus providing no support for the warm-glow interpretation.
6.3. Conclusions and Conjectures
This experiment establishes at least one circumstance in which voluntary contributions to a
public good are not completely crowded out in laboratory markets.  The incomplete crowding out,
however, is not as great as suggested by the empirical studies of this phenomenon in the naturally
occurring environment.  Furthermore, the laboratory evidence suggests a simple extension of the
public good model to incorporate warm-glow giving cannot adequately account for the crowding out
behaviour observed in the laboratory. 











is small, but falls to zero and becomes negative as   continues to rise, will yield predictions gi
consistent with the laboratory results reported here and by Andreoni (1993) provided   is very
df(gi)
dgi
close to zero when   equals the Nash equilibrium prediction of the conventional model.  We gi
conjecture such a model would apply in future experiments.  Because the Nash equilibrium prediction19
of the conventional model differs in the present design and the Andreoni design (5 of 20 tokens in the
former, 3 of 7 in the latter), the above conjecture suggests that the subjects’ attitudes towards giving
depend not only on how much is given voluntarily, but on the Nash equilibrium which would emerge
if the public good were funded entirely by voluntary contributions.  This suggests a complex
relationship between voluntary giving, income, and preferences which might profitably be investigated
in future research.20
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Note: During periods 1, 2, and 3 subjects were introduced to each of the three minimum
contribution constraints for the first time.  These periods were treated as preliminary trials and
the data from these periods are not included in the analysis in this paper.23
TABLE 2
 EQUILIBRIUM PREDICTIONS
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Note: g0, g3, and g5 are the voluntary contributions made in Treatments A, B, and C.24
TABLE 3
CONTRIBUTIONS
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Note:  git is the contribution by subject i in period t.  The means of git are based on 240




































































































































Note: A3 and A5 are the distributions of treatment A contributions with contributions of 0, 1, 2
and 3 pooled and of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 pooled respectively.  B5 is the distribution of treatment
B contributions with contributions of 3, 4 and 5 pooled.